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Mental imagery, or the ability to simulate in the mind information that is not currently
perceived by the senses, has attracted considerable research interest in psychology
since the early 1970’s. Within the past two decades, research in this field—as in
cognitive psychology more generally—has been dominated by neuroscientific methods
that typically involve comparisons between imagery performance of participants from
clinical populations with those who exhibit apparently normal cognitive functioning.
Although this approach has been valuable in identifying key neural substrates of visual
imagery, it has been less successful in understanding the possible mechanisms underlying
another simulation process, namely, motor imagery or the mental rehearsal of actions
without engaging in the actual movements involved. In order to address this oversight, a
“strength-based” approach has been postulated which is concerned with understanding
those on the high ability end of the imagery performance spectrum. Guided by the
expert performance approach and principles of ecological validity, converging methods
have the potential to enable imagery researchers to investigate the neural “signature”
of elite performers, for example. Therefore, the purpose of this paper is to explain
the origin, nature, and implications of the strength-based approach to mental imagery.
Following a brief explanation of the background to this latter approach, we highlight
some important theoretical advances yielded by recent research on mental practice,
mental travel, and meta-imagery processes in expert athletes and dancers. Next, we
consider the methodological implications of using a strength-based approach to investigate
imagery processes. The implications for the field of motor cognition are outlined and
specific research questions, in dynamic imagery, imagery perspective, measurement,
multi-sensory imagery, and metacognition that may benefit from this approach in the
future are sketched briefly.
Keywords: expertise, mental imagery, metacognition, motor cogniton, converging methods, mental practice,
mental travel, mental rotation
INTRODUCTION
Since the classic study on mental rotations by Shepard and
Metzler (1971) four decades ago, research on mental imagery,
or “an internal representation that gives rise to the experience
of perception in the absence of the appropriate sensory input”
(Wraga and Kosslyn, 2002, p. 466), has flourished in cognitive
psychology (e.g., Paivio et al., 1968), cognitive neuropsychology
(e.g., Farah, 2000a), cognitive neuroscience (e.g., Kosslyn et al.,
2006), and more recently, in the study of motor cognition (e.g.,
Jeannerod, 2001, 2006a). The common concern of researchers in
these fields conveys the extent to which exploring mental imagery
has become part of the cognitive science zeitgeist (Cornoldi and
De Beni, 2012). Furthermore, mental imagery has also been of
interest to those concerned with its application in the domains of
skill acquisition (e.g., Sevdalis et al., 2013), rehabilitation sciences
(e.g., Malouin and Richards, 2013) and professional expertise
(e.g., Kozhevnikov and Blajenkova, 2013). What is it about men-
tal imagery that has captured the interest of scientists across an
array of disciplines for four decades? The answer to that question,
as we shall see, is perhaps as complex as the construct of mental
imagery itself.
Imagery, due to its ephemeral nature, has provided significant
challenges for psychology since it first received formal research
attention over a century ago (e.g., Galton, 1883). Chief among
these challenges were the empirical question of how best to
measure imagery given the limitations of the introspective meth-
ods (Kosslyn, 1980) and the theoretical question of whether the
mental representation underlying imagery is propositional or
analogical in nature (Block, 1983). Kosslyn et al. (2006) have
provided a comprehensive proposal to resolve this latter issue.
Despite such challenges, scientists have made significant progress
in capturing the intricacies of mental imagery processes and
applications by using new approaches (e.g., neuroscientific meth-
ods such as fMRI; Slotnick et al., 2005). Building on this need for
new paradigms, the purpose of the present paper is to explore the
possibility that a strength-based approach to imagery—one that
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focuses explicitly on recruiting participants at the high-ability
end of the continuum of expertise—can augment conventional
approaches to this construct. We argue that a strength-based
approach may be valuable in illuminating both fundamental
and applied questions (e.g., do expert athletes and/or dancers
possess distinctive insights into meta-imagery processes in their
domain?) which have so far evaded imagery researchers. In pur-
suit of this objective, the paper is organized as follows. In the
first section, we shall review the strengths and weaknesses of con-
ventional approaches to sampling that have dominated research
on mental imagery for over a century. Next, we shall present
an alternative approach to mental imagery research that we call
the “strength-based” paradigm. The significant factors that led to
the emergence of this paradigm will also be summarized. In the
final section, we shall outline some potentially fruitful new direc-
tions in imagery research that can be addressed by supplementing
traditional approaches with this strength-based paradigm.
KEY SAMPLES IN MENTAL IMAGERY RESEARCH
The study of imagery has profited greatly from neuroscientific
methods (Behrmann, 2000). Given that it was a neglected topic
for almost 50 years, its return from obscurity is remarkable
(Kosslyn et al., 1995). Integral to the popularity of imagery as a
legitimate scientific topic has been the increased strength in the
inferences drawn from the research findings. These inferences are
based on two aspects of the research process, the methodological
tools and the approach to sampling (Table 1). The latter of these
will be discussed in light of the converging methods approach of
neuroscience (Kosslyn and Koenig, 1992).
Smith and Kosslyn (2007) describe the development of three
main approaches in studying cognition: behavioral measures
(e.g., latencies on computer-based tasks), correlational neural
methods (e.g., fMRI), and causal neural methods (e.g., neuropsy-
chological studies). Typical of this latter approach are compar-
isons between the performances of two groups on a task that
requires imagery (i.e., behavioral data). The groupsmay comprise
those who exhibit normal cognitive functioning or participants
from clinical populations (Senior et al., 2006). Furthermore, the
methods are often combined (i.e., behavioral data from nor-
mal and patient samples during brain imaging). Studying the
deficits of patients with brain damage and impairments can
establish that certain brain areas (e.g., by double dissociation)
are at least partially responsible for a particular cognitive func-
tion. Neuropsychological evidence of both deficits following brain
damage and brain activation patterns have been fundamental to
the accumulating knowledge base of mental imagery (Kosslyn
et al., 2006). Robust inferences can obviously be determined from
monitoring changes in intact brain regions (Sarter et al., 1996),
particularly when combined with theory-driven experimental
paradigms (Kosslyn et al., 2006). Consequently, the neural-based
studies with patients suffer from issues of generalizability but rely-
ing on converging evidence these limitations have largely been
overcome.
From the above one could conclude that the cognitive neu-
roscience approach has encompassed participants across the per-
formance spectrum, from those with deficits to those with high
abilities. The nomothetic method has ultimately emphasized
normative scores and even sophisticated statistical models are
used to average date from neural imaging studies (Senior et al.,
2006). Individual differences have not been central to the men-
tal imagery research program in recent decades although as we
shall see later in this paper, they provided an impetus for the
strength-based approach. What is apparent from the aforemen-
tioned investigations is the paucity of research with participants
at the high end of the continuum. Ability measures have been
used widely to assess handedness (e.g., lateralization invento-
ries) and they have been employed to discriminate good from
poor imagers (e.g., Isaac and Marks, 1994). Indeed, highly skilled
imagers may have been among the student samples in the clas-
sic imagery experiments of Kosslyn et al. (1978) and Shepard
and Metzler (1971). The deficit-based approach which included
both patients and healthy subjects may have overlooked poten-
tial insights, as we will propose later, from those who are highly
skilled on imagery ability measures.
Nevertheless, the success of the prevailing paradigm has been
the accumulation over four decades of substantive empirical
evidence from case studies, behavioral data, and meta-analytic
reviews (Kosslyn et al., 2006). Furthermore, evidence has emerged
over the past two decades substantiating the neural basis of motor
imagery (Munzert and Zentgraf, 2009; Munzert et al., 2009),
olfactory imagery (Bensafi et al., 2003; Djordjevic et al., 2005),
auditory imagery (Hubbard, 2010), gustatory imagery (Nitschke
et al., 2006), spatial imagery (Kosslyn et al., 2007; Kozhevnikov
and Blajenkova, 2013), and the role of emotions in imagery
(Kosslyn, 2010).
However, some limitations in the key methods of cognitive
neuroscience are also evident, and they may explain why our
understanding of visual imagery is more comprehensive than
that of other modalities (Moran et al., 2012). The scanning tech-
nologies to date (e.g., fMRI) restrict movement and thus limit
maximal contractions during measurement. As a result, typically
only discrete movements can be performed (e.g., small finger or
foot movements; Pascual-Leone et al., 1995; Brown et al., 2005).
Interestingly, transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) offers a
different approach to studying action-one that is far more flexible
as cortical functions can be disrupted even among normal con-
trols (Walsh and Cowey, 2000; Stewart and Walsh, 2006). These
methods may have obscured some aspects of imagery but we posit
that in combination with the strength-based approach, they will
ultimately illuminate the construct further.
ANTECEDENTS OF A “STRENGTH-BASED” APPROACH
In many respects, the “strength-based” approach to understand-
ing mental imagery is not a new phenomenon. In fact, we
believe that it has three key antecedents—the individual dif-
ferences approach to imagery (e.g., Galton, 1883), the idea of
imagery as a cognitive simulation process (e.g., Jeannerod, 1994),
and the emergence of a movement (known as “motor cognition”;
see Jeannerod, 2006a) which is committed to the investigation
of imagery-action relationships. As we shall explain below, we
believe that these three antecedents have contributed certain
key ideas which come together in the strength-based approach
(Table 2). For example, the individual differences tradition led to
the discovery that certain mental imagery processes are trainable.
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org April 2013 | Volume 7 | Article 104 | 2
MacIntyre et al. Strength-based approach to mental imagery
Ta
b
le
1
|S
u
m
m
ar
y
o
f
tr
ad
it
io
n
al
ap
p
ro
ac
h
es
to
sa
m
p
lin
g
in
m
en
ta
li
m
ag
er
y
re
se
ar
ch
w
it
h
h
u
m
an
p
ar
ti
ci
p
an
ts
.
S
am
p
le
s
Pa
ra
d
ig
m
M
et
h
o
d
G
o
al
S
tr
en
g
th
s
Li
m
it
at
io
n
s
La
n
d
m
ar
k
st
u
d
y
E
xp
er
im
en
te
rs
w
er
e
in
cl
ud
ed
in
th
e
sa
m
pl
e
of
he
al
th
y
su
bj
ec
ts
In
di
vi
du
al
di
ffe
re
nc
es
ap
pr
oa
ch
In
tr
os
pe
ct
io
n
U
nd
er
st
an
d
ph
en
om
en
ol
og
y
In
fo
rm
at
io
n
ap
pe
ar
s
to
be
ea
sy
to
te
st
H
ig
hl
y
su
bj
ec
tiv
e
Pe
rk
y
(1
91
0)
st
ud
y
of
vi
su
al
im
ag
er
y
an
d
pe
rc
ep
tio
n
H
ea
lth
y
su
bj
ec
ts
La
rg
e
no
.o
f
su
bj
ec
ts
P
sy
ch
om
et
ric
ap
pr
oa
ch
Q
ue
st
io
nn
ai
re
s
Fo
cu
s
on
in
di
vi
du
al
di
ffe
re
nc
es
an
d
su
b-
sc
al
e
pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
S
ub
je
ct
iv
e
Po
te
nt
ia
lr
es
po
ns
e
bi
as
(e
.g
.,
ce
nt
ra
lt
en
de
nc
y)
M
ar
ks
(1
97
3)
Vi
vi
dn
es
s
of
Vi
su
al
Im
ag
er
y
Q
ue
st
io
nn
ai
re
(V
V
IQ
)
H
ea
lth
y
su
bj
ec
ts
an
d
ty
pi
ca
lly
rig
ht
-h
an
de
d
(b
as
ed
on
la
te
ra
lit
y
te
st
s)
La
rg
e
no
.o
f
su
bj
ec
ts
E
xp
er
im
en
ta
la
pp
ro
ac
h
R
es
po
ns
e
tim
es
(e
.g
.,
M
en
ta
ls
ca
nn
in
g
ta
sk
)
N
or
m
al
iz
ed
da
ta
O
bj
ec
tiv
e
an
d
ea
sy
to
te
st
la
rg
e
N
Tr
ad
e-
of
f
be
tw
ee
n
st
ru
ct
ur
e
an
d
pr
oc
es
s
S
om
e
cr
iti
ci
sm
of
po
te
nt
ia
ld
em
an
d
ch
ar
ac
te
ris
tic
s
(P
yl
ys
hy
n,
20
03
)a
nd
ris
k
in
us
e
of
so
ph
is
tic
at
ed
su
bj
ec
ts
it
to
ok
lo
ng
er
fo
r
su
bj
ec
ts
to
co
ns
ci
ou
sl
y
sc
an
be
tw
ee
n
im
ag
e
fe
at
ur
es
th
at
w
er
e
re
la
tiv
el
y
fu
rt
he
r
ap
ar
t
th
an
be
tw
ee
n
th
os
e
th
at
ap
pe
ar
ed
cl
os
e
to
ge
th
er
(K
os
sl
yn
et
al
.,
19
78
)
C
og
ni
tiv
e
ne
ur
op
sy
ch
ol
og
ic
al
ap
pr
oa
ch
C
or
re
la
tio
na
ln
eu
ra
l
m
et
ho
ds
Ty
pi
ca
lly
su
bt
ra
ct
iv
e
m
et
ho
ds
w
ith
no
rm
al
iz
ed
da
ta
co
m
bi
ne
d
w
ith
be
ha
vi
or
al
da
ta
H
ea
lth
y
su
bj
ec
ts
an
d
cl
in
ic
al
pa
tie
nt
s
Sy
st
em
at
ic
ex
cl
us
io
n
ba
se
d
on
ce
rt
ai
n
ch
ar
ac
te
ris
tic
s
(e
.g
.,
im
ag
er
y
te
st
pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
)
no
m
ot
he
tic
E
E
G
/E
R
P
R
ec
or
ds
ch
an
ge
s
in
el
ec
tr
ic
al
po
te
nt
ia
ls
vi
a
el
ec
tr
od
es
R
el
at
iv
el
y
no
n-
in
va
si
ve
m
ea
su
re
of
br
ai
n
ac
tiv
ity
Im
pr
ec
is
e
in
re
so
lu
tio
n
O
nl
y
ta
ps
co
rt
ic
al
ch
an
ge
s
R
el
at
iv
el
y
ex
pe
ns
iv
e
E
E
G
ac
tiv
ity
w
as
m
ea
su
re
d
in
fo
ur
ta
sk
s
af
te
r
sa
m
pl
e
w
as
di
vi
de
d
on
th
e
ba
si
s
of
V
V
IQ
sc
or
es
(Is
aa
c
an
d
M
ar
ks
,
19
94
)
H
ea
lth
y
su
bj
ec
ts
an
d
cl
in
ic
al
pa
tie
nt
s
S
m
al
ln
o.
of
su
bj
ec
ts
(<
20
)
no
m
ot
he
tic
P
ET
/f
M
R
I
D
iff
er
en
ce
s
in
th
e
am
ou
nt
s
of
ox
gy
en
co
ns
um
ed
fo
rm
ba
si
s
fo
rt
ec
hn
iq
ue
.
H
ig
h
sp
at
ia
le
xt
en
ta
nd
re
so
lu
tio
n
R
es
tr
ic
te
d
m
ov
em
en
tf
or
su
bj
ec
t
H
ig
hl
y
ex
pe
ns
iv
e
A
re
a
17
us
ed
in
vi
su
al
im
ag
er
y
an
d
pe
rc
ep
tio
n
(K
os
sl
yn
et
al
.,
19
99
)
H
ea
lth
y
su
bj
ec
ts
an
d
cl
in
ic
al
pa
tie
nt
s
S
m
al
ln
o.
of
su
bj
ec
ts
(<
10
)
no
m
ot
he
tic
TM
S
M
ag
ne
tic
pu
ls
e
ca
n
in
hi
bi
to
r
fa
ci
lit
at
e
fu
nc
tio
n
Po
ss
ib
le
to
ta
rg
et
pr
ec
is
e
ar
ea
Lo
w
sp
at
ia
le
xt
en
t
H
ig
hl
y
ex
pe
ns
iv
e
U
se
d
to
in
hi
bi
ti
m
ag
er
y
du
rin
g
re
st
co
nd
iti
on
pr
io
r
to
fM
R
Ic
on
di
tio
n
(K
os
sl
yn
et
al
.,
19
99
)
C
lin
ic
al
pa
tie
nt
s
1-
2
su
bj
ec
ts
w
ith
ra
re
di
so
rd
er
N
eu
ro
ps
yc
ho
lo
gi
ca
l
ca
se
st
ud
ie
s
id
io
gr
ap
hi
c
C
au
sa
ln
eu
ra
lm
et
ho
ds
O
bs
er
va
tio
n
of
pa
tt
er
ns
of
di
ss
oc
ia
tio
n
an
d
as
so
ci
at
io
n
A
bi
lit
y
to
re
la
te
br
ai
n
lo
ci
to
fu
nc
tio
ns
U
ni
qu
en
es
s
lim
its
ab
ili
ty
to
ge
ne
ra
liz
e
D
is
so
ci
at
io
n
re
po
rt
ed
be
tw
ee
n
m
en
ta
li
m
ag
er
y
an
d
ob
je
ct
re
co
gn
iti
on
in
pa
tie
nt
w
ith
br
ai
n
da
m
ag
e
(B
eh
rm
an
n
et
al
.,
19
92
)
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org April 2013 | Volume 7 | Article 104 | 3
MacIntyre et al. Strength-based approach to mental imagery
Table 2 | Antecedents to the strength-based approach in mental imagery research.
Issue Source Contribution
Mental Practice (MP) effect Vandell et al., 1943 Richardson (1967a,b) first narrative review of MP
Trainability of imagery Shepard and Metzler, 1971 Subjects performed several thousand trials over 8–10 weeks
Mental travel effect Decety et al., 1989 Congruence found between the duration of locomotion task and imagery
Converging methods approach Kosslyn and Koenig, 1992 Kosslyn (1994) Neurally based computational model had superseded
computational account (Kosslyn, 1980)
Role of deliberate practice in expertise Ericsson et al., 1993 Expertise is domain-specific and is acquired through practice
Motor cognition approach Jeannerod, 1994 Imagery is integral to motor preparation and action (Jeannerod, 2001, 2006a,b)
Individual differences in imagery
ability
Kosslyn et al., 1998 MRT and rCBF study demonstrating two different ways to perform mental
rotation, one that involves processes that execute movements and one that
may not
Similarly, the theory of “imagery as simulation” has helped
researchers to postulate theoretical explanations for certain robust
effects in imagery research (e.g., expertise effects in research on
the phenomena of “mental practice” and “mental travel”; see
explanation of terms below). Finally, the motor cognition move-
ment has enabled theoretical bridges to be built between imagery
research in cognitive sport psychology and that in neuroscience
(see also Moran et al., 2012).
INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES
It has long-been known (e.g., since Galton, 1883) that people
differ reliably from each other in their imagery experiences and
skills. For instance, whereas some people can report intense visual
and motor images, akin to actually “seeing” the experience and
“feeling” the effort (e.g., running up a stairs), others report little
detail in their recollection of imagery. This discovery of individual
differences in imagery has led to several important if somewhat
under-appreciated breakthroughs in our understanding of this
construct. For example, consider Shepard and Metzler’s (1971)
study of mental rotations or people’s ability to turn things over
in their mind in order to answer questions about the spatial ori-
entation of certain pairs of shapes. It is worth noting that the
participants in this study were not naïve subjects but highly prac-
ticed individual who had performed several thousand trials over
8–10 weeks. Crucially, this study highlighted the fact that men-
tal rotation processes were not only measurable but trainable
too. Interestingly, the extensive practice trials sparked follow-up
research on the role of practice in mental rotation effects (Steiger
and Yuille, 1983). Results showed that mental rotation effects were
robust—regardless of the amount of training received by partici-
pants (Leone et al., 1993). Another notable finding from imagery
studies in this era concerns Kosslyn’s (1994) report that Jacky
Metzler (co-author with Roger Shepard) had commented that
some subjects had experienced what appeared to be “kinesthetic”
sensations during imagery. It now seems that the mental rotations
task, which was originally assumed to be visuo-spatial in nature,
may actually involve the motor system. This discovery of motor
involvement in visuospatial imagery could account for the early
findings in neuroimaging studies of mental rotation that reported
multiple brain areas activated during the task (Kosslyn et al.,
2001a). Indeed, Kosslyn had argued that “visual mental images
are transformed in part via motor processes” (1994, p. 345). A key
question arose for researchers: do different strategies influence
performance on mental rotations ability? In 1998, an rCBF tech-
nique was employed while subjects mentally rotated either hands
or the original 3-D block objects (Kosslyn et al., 1998). The results
highlighted that two mechanisms could be applied—“one mech-
anism that recruits processes that prepare motor movements and
another that does not” (Kosslyn et al., 1998, p. 151). Findings on
the neural basis of mental rotation, while dependent on the type
of stimuli (animate vs. inanimate), may be contaminated by some
subjects using a motor-based strategy. In a follow-up study, sub-
jects either imagined rotating 3-D block isomers by hand or by a
motor and the neural evidence demonstrated differential activa-
tion of the motor and visual cortex, respectively (Kosslyn et al.,
2001b).
Another consequence of the individual differences movement
was the range of expert samples used (e.g., pilots; Dror et al.,
1993) and the range of methods expanded to explore in an eco-
logical way the application of mental imagery in everyday life.
For example, a weeklong diary study found that students reported
using imagery for a range of purposes including problem solving
(e.g., navigation) and mental practice (Kosslyn et al., 1990).
IMAGERY AND SIMULATION
The idea of imagery as a cognitive simulation technique may
be traced back to William James’ (1890) ideomotor principle
(Jeannerod, 2006b). Since then, two different imagery effects have
come to the attention of researchers—firstly, “mental practice,”
and secondly, “mental travel.”
Firstly, mental practice, or “the systematic use of mental
imagery to rehearse an action in the minds eye without engaging
the actual physical movements involved” (Moran, 2012, p. 349),
has been subjected to formal study since the 1940’s (Vandell
et al., 1943). In the intervening decades several hundred stud-
ies have investigated the mental practice effect, which based on
meta-analytic research has a significant positive effect on the per-
formance of motor skills (Driskell et al., 1994). A number of
moderating variables were reported including the type of task
and experience level. To explain, experienced athletes appear to
benefit more from mental practice than do novices. This finding
suggests a possible constraint on the efficacy of mental practice
for novice learners. Specifically, as Driskell et al. (1994) proposed,
that for “novices, who have not formed an approximation of the
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skill, the symbolic rehearsal provided by mental practice may not
be sufficient to guide performance” (p. 489). One explanation for
this expertise effect within mental practice is that the enhanced
imagery abilities of experts may enable them to develop greater
implicit knowledge of the spatial and kinesthetic requirements of
the tasks than is possible for relative novices. Alternatively, experts
may simply possess greater meta-cognitive knowledge of how to
employ imagery effectively for skill improvement as compared
with novices.
Since the early 1990’s researchers have continued to show how
mental practice can improve sport skills (e.g., flip-turn in swim-
ming; Casby andMoran, 1998), surgical skills (Arora et al., 2011),
and can accelerate the process of neurorehabilitation (McEwan
et al., 2009). However, many questions remain unanswered. For
example, what are the exact psychological mechanisms underly-
ing mental practice effects (Kosslyn and Moulton, 2009)? How
best does one apply imagery optimally in motor skill rehearsal
(Weinberg, 2008)? And how do elite athletes employ mental prac-
tice in field settings (Moran, 2012)? Nevertheless, the mental
practice literature highlighted the clever application of imagery
among elite sport participants (Morris et al., 2005). And fur-
thermore, the awareness of the mental practice effect created a
common interest for sport psychologists and cognitive neurosci-
entists alike. While the former were primarily concerned with
performance as the dependent variable, the latter were interested
in the neural basis. In fact, researchers within the field of sport
psychology have called for models of mental imagery in sport to
be grounded in the neuroscientific literature and attempts at such
theorizing have been tried (Holmes and Collins, 2001; Guillot and
Collet, 2008; Wakefield et al., 2013).
The second imagery effect that has been reported in the lit-
erature is the mental travel effect, which is concerned with the
relationship between the duration of a simulated movement (i.e.,
through imagery) and its executed counterpart (Decety et al.,
1989). For example, in the early study by Decety et al. (1989),
participants had to perform a blindfold walk and then men-
tally simulate the walk. Congruence between the duration for the
tasks in each condition was reported in this study. Since then a
robust mental travel effect has consistently been found while both
underestimation and overestimation may occur in certain con-
ditions, the temporal coupling of simulated and executed action
is strongly influenced by expertise. Reviews have indicated that
elite performers in sport are highly proficient at this skill (Guillot
and Collet, 2005; Guillot et al., 2012a,b). For example, strong cor-
relations have been reported between the time taken to rehearse
completing a canoe-slalom course and the motor execution time
(Moran and MacIntyre, 1998). Conversely, patients with devel-
opmental movement disorder (e.g., Gabbard et al., 2012), and a
variety of neurological disorders of the motor system have been
demonstrated to perform poorly on tests comparing the duration
of simulated and executed movements (Guillot and Collet, 2005).
MOTOR COGNITION
As a consequence of the robust findings on imagery effects, motor
imagery rose to prominence at the interface between cognitive
neuroscience and sport psychology (Moran et al., 2012). Since
Jeannerod’s landmark paper in 1994, the implications of motor
imagery as a window into the representation of action have been
acknowledged by numerous researchers (e.g., Guillot and Collet,
2005; Smith and Kosslyn, 2007; Bläsing et al., 2012). The adop-
tion of this new umbrella term, motor cognition, may now ensure
that the study of action is within the realm of cognitive neuro-
science after a degree of neglect by researchers within psychol-
ogy (Rosenbaum, 2005). By implication the domains of dance
(Bläsing et al., 2010), sport (Kosslyn andMoulton, 2009) have all,
as a consequence, evolved as natural laboratories for the study of
motor cognition. Why the neglect of motor control by psychol-
ogy? Rosenbaum (2005) argues that “motor control has had the
status of Cinderella in psychological research” (p. 308). Among
the reasons for the failure of psychology to engage in attempts to
understand aspects of motor control were the “too hard to study
hypothesis.” Undoubtedly the complexity of psychological aspects
of motor control was a barrier to research, but the raison d’être
may be that the methodological barriers hindered its exploration.
It seems plausible to propose that motor imagery has only become
a topic of study since researchers have had the methodological
tools to explore it (i.e., through mental kinematics). The afore-
mentioned factors, allied with the expertise paradigm, based on
the theory of deliberate practice (Ericsson et al., 1993; Ericsson,
2009) provides the impetus for the strength-based approach.
THE STRENGTH-BASED APPROACH TO STUDYING MENTAL
IMAGERY
The “strength-based” approach provides an extension of the pre-
vailing paradigm of cognitive neuroscience, which has focused
primarily upon investigations with both healthy subjects and
patient samples. Instead, the emphasis is on those at the high abil-
ity end of the continuum. Furthermore, it posits that an expertise
paradigm should be employed, to ensure that a comprehensive
rationale is provided for the selection of participants (i.e., they
meet multiple criteria to establish their level of performance).
To tap this expertise efficiently, it is proposed that the converg-
ing methods approach is applied and moreover, that ecological
validity is considered in the experimental design (Table 3).
Two key issues integral to the application of the strength-based
approach are now highlighted. These are quantifying expertise
and applying the principle of ecological validity. Subsequently,
recent examples of this approach in music, sport, and dance
samples are discussed. And finally, we highlight where we fore-
see the “strength-based” approach can illuminate the interaction
between cognition and action (motor cogntion), the integra-
tion of multi-sensory information in perception and simulation,
and the role of conscious thought and knowledge in imagery
(metacognition).
EXPERTISE PARADIGM
Expert performance is defined as consistently superior perfor-
mance on a specified set of representative tasks for the domain
that can be administered to any subject (Ericsson, 2009). Ericsson
and Smith (1991) proposed the expert performance approach to
understand the critical mechanisms underlying expertise. Thus,
the “strength-based” approach advances the prevailing research
paradigms by explicitly exploring experts to enhance our under-
standing of mental imagery. As we have noted, this had been done
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Table 3 | Proposed assumptions of the strength-based approach.
Assumption Implications
Expertise approach
(Ericsson et al., 1993)
• Use the dimension of expertise to choose
samples
• Employ multiple criteria to establish level
of expertise
• Explore expertise across domains relevant
to mental imagery processes
Ecological validity
(Neisser, 1976, 1978)
• To preserve the domain-specific expertise
elements of ecological validity should be
included in the study design
• This should occur across the different
dimensions-nature of the setting, stimuli,
and response set
Converging methods
(Kosslyn and Koenig, 1992)
• This approach should be employed to
explore the interaction between abilities,
the brain and computation
Theory-based approach • Research questions should be guided by
theory
• Functional-equivalence and structural
equivalent accounts of mental imagery
provide a road map for research questions
previously but it occurred in an implicit fashion. For instance, the
training in the original mental rotation study hinted at the devel-
opment of expertise (Shepard and Metzler, 1971). Only recently
have experts been targeted consistently as samples by cognitive
neuroscientists (Table 4). Notable exceptions include the use of
expert samples (i.e., artists) by Blajenkova et al. (2006) in their
validation of the Object-Spatial Imagery Questionnaire. Another
example of the implicit expertise approach was the inclusion of
US air force pilots in a study by Dror et al. (1993) on their visual-
spatial ability. However, in that case, we would assert that their
expertise should be quantifiable across multiple criteria including
their memory, metacognitive skills, and not simply the number of
flying hours accrued.
The challenge for researchers, therefore, is to quantify pre-
cisely what constitutes an expert. Standardized ranking systems
within domains like chess make this possible (Saarliluoma et al.,
2004) but in sport, dance, and music, it is more difficult to have
a standard metric. Typically researchers in sport have defined
an expertise as a function of competitive level (e.g., novice, col-
legiate, elite, professional). This simple rubric, with elite being
denoted as those competing at the highest possible level (Van den
Auweele et al., 1993) is vague and may not adequately reflect the
nature of the expertise. For example, is an elite athlete equiva-
lent to a chess Grandmaster? Consequently, there is a need to
fractionate experts from one another in terms of expertise. In
domains such as music, dance, and sport “performance can be
publically observed and even objectively measured in open com-
petition and public performances” (Ericsson, 2009, p. 18). And
moreover, given that expertise is distinguishable according to
criteria, including metacognition (Ericsson, 2009), the precise
performance across a matrix of measures of expertise should be
explored (e.g., declarative knowledge, predictive ability).
Furthermore, comparisons across expert groups should be
applied rather than simply exploring expert-novice differences.
Experts and novices can easily be discriminated from one another
in many domains on such an array of variables that the com-
parison can be meaningless. Instead the emphasis should be
on inclusion criteria that target participants on the expertise
spectrum based upon the research question. To explain, while
the studies listed in Table 4 have samples that reflect a range
of abilities, it is evident that purposive sampling was applied.
For example, to understand learning a novice sample were used
(Bezzola et al., 2012) and on the other hand, a spectrum of abil-
ities were represented in Ross et al.’s (2003) investigation of links
between activated brain areas and golf skill.
The primacy of the expertise approach within the “strength-
based” approach supplements the prevailing approach with the
intention of exploring the role of expertise in mental imagery
processes. Experts can be recruited, for instance, on the basis
of their special imagery abilities or their sport, or professional
activity expertise. Moreover, choosing appropriate activities from
which to recruit samples should be based upon the cognitive
task-demands of the actions, rather than an ad-hoc decision. One
paradox is that clinical patients may develop specialized abilities
in order to cope with the demands of their deficits. One such
example is the case of IW, a patient with peripheral neuropathy,
who has shown diminished motor imagery ability but enhanced
visual imagery ability relative to controls (ter Horst et al., 2012).
The inclusion of expertise as a variable inmental imagery research
can shed light on both the processes underlying imagery and its
potential application.
ECOLOGICAL VALIDITY
The expert performance approach of Ericsson and Smith (1991)
proposes that field or laboratory tasks are designed in order to
retain a high level of ecological validity. As Saarliluoma et al.
(2004) states “it is important to vary the way basic concepts such
as mental imagery are operationalized to avoid the metascien-
tific Ebbinghaus effect” (p. 753–754). In other words, complex
and dynamic tasks in which imagery processes are important
should be subject to scientific scrutiny or aspects of the under-
lying processes may be overlooked. One persistent criticism of
imagery research within the sport context is the use of tasks
lacking ecological validity (Morris et al., 2005; Moran, 2012).
This challenge applies to perhaps a greater degree within neu-
roscience where simple laboratory tasks (usually involving con-
strained movements of the fingers) that are chosen not only for
their amenability to computational modeling but also for the
ease with which they can be mastered after a relatively small
amount of practice (Nielsen and Cohen, 2008; Yarrow et al.,
2009). Ecological validity is a necessary component of studies
that are targeting expertise as if we are to determine their abilities
within a converging methods approach, some transfer of skill and
process should occur (Moran, 2012). The dimensions of ecologi-
cal validity include the nature of the setting, the stimuli, and the
response (Schmuckler, 2001). These interlinked dimensions can
be considered within the converging methods approach that is
integral to the “strength-based” approach. For example, the diary
study methodology conducted by Kosslyn et al. (1990) could be
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Table 4 | Recent studies using neuroimaging methods in mental imagery with music, sport, and dance samples.
Question Method Authors Sample Findings
An attempt to define any
association between activated
brain areas and golf skill
fMRI of imagery of
golf swing
Ross et al., 2003 6 golfers from novice
to elite level
Decreased brain activation occurred with
increased golf skill level for the SMA and
cerebellum with little activation of basal
ganglia
Investigation of the cortical
network which mediates
music performance compared
to music imagery
fMRI Meister et al., 2004 12 music academy
students
Activations of premotor areas and
precuneus were found in both conditions,
contralateral M1 and posterior parietal
cortex were active during performance only
Comparison of neural
networks of expert and novice
golfers during simulation of
pre-shot routine
fMRI of imagined
pre-shot routine
Milton et al., 2007 6 expert and 7 novice
golfers
Extensive practice leads experts to develop
a focused and efficient organization of
task-related neural networks, whereas
novices have difficulty filtering out
irrelevant information
To investigate differences in
brain activity between groups
and to effect of the use of
internal vs. external
perspective
fMRI of motor
imagery of a high
jump
Olsson et al., 2008 High-jumpers (12
elite and 12 novices)
Imagery training reduces the activity in
parietal cortex suggesting that imagery is
performed more automatic and results in a
more efficient motor representation more
easily accessed during motor performance
Role of experience in
facilitating corticospinal
representations of actions
TMS of familiar and
unfamiliar skills
Fourkas et al., 2008 3 expert tennis
players
Subjective reports indicated that only in the
tennis imagery condition did experts differ
from novices in the ability to form
proprioceptive images
To investigate multi-modal
musical imagery performed by
expert pianist
fMRI during
imagery and
simulated motor
performance of a
memorized extract
Davidson-Kelly et al.,
2011
42-year-old expert
pianist
Pattern of activation for performed and
imagined piano music was similar, with the
motor system of the brain showing similar
activation during both conditions (except
for M1)
Study of dynamic
neurofunctional changes
induced by a physical training
fMRI of golf putts in
longitudinal study
over 40 h training
Bezzola et al., 2012 11 novice golfers and
age-matched controls
Training induces functional neuroplasticity
and skill improvement is associated with a
modified activation pattern
utilized to evaluate experts’ imagery use over time (e.g., profes-
sional dancers). This approach offers researchers a naturalistic
laboratory for investigating imagery and action (Moran, 2009).
NEW APPROACHES TO OLD QUESTIONS
Borrowing from Boring (1957), it may be argued that imagery
research has a long past but only a short history and that some
enduring questions in this field remain unanswered. As we have
noted, perennial issues around imagery measurement, theory,
and function have been central to enquiry for over a century
(Roekelein, 2004). For instance, Jeannerod (2006b) states that the
“mental conception of action” or the “motor idea,” “to account for
the role of memory images or remote impressions in shaping an
action” has been with us since the time of William James (p. 360).
The key issue is how the prevailing paradigm of cognitive neuro-
science has shifted in recent decades. We have seen how the field
of cognitive psychology has been reconstituted since the 1990s
with an increasing emphasis on neural implementation (Smith
and Kosslyn, 2007; Anderson, 2010). Moreover, the key topics that
delineated cognitive psychology in the early textbooks have been
extended to include neuroscience methods, emotion, and action
(Smith and Kosslyn, 2007). Furthermore, Martha Farah has stated
that the present paradigm of cognitive neuroscience “is far from
having outlived its usefulness . . . and I’d like to see it continue to
move towards the edge of our understanding” (2000b, p. 362).
The evidence presented heretofore, on the growth of the
“strength-based” approach, conveys how it has augmented the
study of abilities within the cognitive neuroscience triangle
(Kosslyn, 1994). The expansion of the “strength-based” approach
within mental imagery research opens up new modes of enquiry
for mental imagery and perception (e.g., Tartaglia et al., 2009)
and specifically in our understanding of action processes. Motor
cognition research has the potential to shed light on imagery
processes, the representation of action, and the role of imagery
processes in experts.
MOTOR COGNITION
Three key questions within the field of motor cognition can be
understood by applying the “strength-based” approach. One issue
surrounds the role of action coupled with motor imagery, what
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has been termed dynamic imagery (MacIntyre andMoran, 2010).
Motor imagery, by definition, occurs in the absence of any overt
movement or motor output (Guillot and Collet, 2010). However,
on the basis that athletes often engage in movements while
engaging in imagery, sport psychologists have recommended that
performers apply this in their imagery practice (Holmes and
Collins, 2001) and moreover, they have amended their definition
of mental imagery to include possible motor output (Morris et al.,
2005). Researchers had noted that athletes engaged in either syn-
chronous movements (e.g., simulating the task) or asynchronous
movements (e.g., other movements) during imagery (MacIntyre
and Moran, 2010). The role of these quasi-movements (Nikulin
et al., 2008) has yet to be rigorously evaluated. Preliminary evi-
dence suggests that athletes find this beneficial (MacIntyre and
Moran, 2010) but to date research has not investigated the com-
plex issue of coupling action and motor imagery by athletes (for
an exception see Guillot et al., 2013). Evidence from other sam-
ples suggests that this is a topic worthy of further research. For
example, Ionta et al. (2012) reported that variations in the hand
position of participants’ during mental rotations tasks influenced
the latencies for congruent stimuli. They concluded that sensory-
motor and postural information coming from the body might
influence mental rotation of body parts according to specific,
somatotopic rules. These preliminary findings were congruent
with the body-specificity hypothesis that claims that body-specific
patterns of motor experience shape the way we think (Casasanto,
2011). Furthermore, future findings from this line of enquirymay
have ramifications for the recent accounts of embodied cogni-
tion (Borghi and Cimatti, 2010; Gallese and Sinigaglia, 2012).
One confound that has been noted in research on the action-
motor imagery coupling is the imagery perspective (the viewpoint
adopted during visual imagery). This has resulted in debate
in both sport psychology and cognitive neuroscience. Moran
(2012) noted that the complexity of agency, visual perspective,
and confounds with kinesthetic or motor imagery were reflected
in the findings emanating from sport psychology. Researchers
had developed sophisticated methodologies to attempt to control
and measure the visual perspective adopted during testing. The
“strength-based” approach is one possible route to understanding
this topic further. A recent special issue of the Journal of Mental
Imagery on whether the internal viewpoint is a default hypothesis
is testament to the continuing interest in this topic (Morris and
Spittle, 2012). The issue of visual perspective in mental imagery,
because of the conflation with both visual imagery and motor
imagery in the past, has been noted as a topic that necessitates
further research (Madan and Singhal, 2012).
A second question that relates tomotor cognition is the process
of multi-sensory integration, which is an area of current debate
(Foxe and Molholm, 2009). More specifically, the relative contri-
bution of different senses in the simulation of action is of direct
concern to neuroscientists (Lacey and Lawson, 2013). Recently,
this topic has received increased attention because of concerns
with the traditional approach in the understanding and applica-
tion ofmulti-sensory imagery. For example, within sport psychol-
ogy, it was traditionally assumed that a multi-modal approach
was optimal (Morris et al., 2005). However, this has recently
been questioned on the basis that it may be more important to
only imagine the pertinent senses (Holmes and Collins, 2001;
Weinberg, 2008; MacIntyre and Moran, 2010). Initial evidence,
from fMRI studies (Ross et al., 2003), dual-task studies (Smyth
and Waller, 1998), and qualitative accounts of how elite perform-
ers employ imagery (Munroe et al., 2000; MacIntyre and Moran,
2007a,b) suggests that the simplistic multi-sensory application
of imagery merits further investigation. Interestingly, this topic
would be of interest across the domains of music, sport, and
dance that have been referred to in this paper. From another
perspective, the importance of different senses underlying the
reported imagery effects has yet to be fully ascertained and both
inhibitory processes during imagery and consolidation effects are
only beginning to be explored (e.g., Guillot et al., 2012a,b).
Fourthly, as discussed in the introduction, measuring imagery
ability has been an issue of controversy for the field since Galton’s
early attempts at quantification (Galton, 1883). The question
“why do people differ so much in their imagery abilities” (Kosslyn
et al., 2001a, p. 641) is still pertinent today. The influence of
implicit or explicit expertise on mental rotations findings, in
mental travel research, and in mental practice studies has been
established (Guillot and Collet, 2005). And moreover, a trend in
imagery research has been the expansion of the imagery ability
from one unitary construct to a number of distinct abilities which
reflect different neural processes (e.g., dorsal vs. ventral stream;
Blajenkova et al., 2006). What is less clear is how imagery abilities
are developed and what is the precise role of these imagery abil-
ities in moderating imagery effects (Madan and Singhal, 2012).
One alternative to the plethora of pencil and paper imagery tests
employed in sport (e.g., Williams and Cumming, 2011) or neu-
roscience settings (e.g., McAvinue and Robertson, 2007) and is to
employ a compound measure, the motor imagery index, which
combines psychometric, behavioral (e.g., mental travel), and psy-
chophysiological measures (Collet et al., 2011). It is vital that we
are able to quantify imagery abilities if we are to match partic-
ipants for competence or if we wish to evaluate the trainability
of imagery abilities. Recent research has explored the trainability
of imagery vividness using robust measures and interestingly, the
only reported changes were in the metacognitive understanding
of their imagery (Rademaker and Pearson, 2012).
META-IMAGERY
Theoretically, a potentially valuable new route for imagery
researchers in cognitive neuroscience concerns the investigation
of the neglected topic of “meta-imagery processes”—“their beliefs
about the nature and regulation of their own imagery skills”
(Moran, 2002, p. 415). Research in the expertise literature sug-
gests that meta-cognition, people’s insight into, and control over
their own mental processes, is a factor that differentiates novices
from experts (Moran, 2012). Interest in this topic surprisingly
emerged from a survey by Denis and Carfantan (1985) who sur-
veyed undergraduate students on their knowledge about imagery
research findings in psychology. The motive for their study was
to quantify the participants’ tacit knowledge of imagery effects
(Denis, 2012). In order to assess the level of tacit knowledge among
experimental subjects they were asked to predict the outcomes
of various imagery experiments that were described but not for-
mally named (e.g., is memory for pictures better than memory
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for words?). The findings indicated that although the majority
of participants predicted correctly that imagery would have ben-
eficial effects on learning and reasoning, few subjects were able
to predict accurately the results of mental rotation experiments
(whereby more time is required to accomplish greater amounts
of rotation of images) or mental scanning studies (whereby
longer distances between points in an image take longer to scan
than shorter distances). Furthermore, a majority of participants
rejected the idea that mental imagery could enhance the per-
formance of motor skills (the mental practice effect). This latter
finding led Denis and Carfantan (1985) to conclude “how coun-
terintuitive the idea is that motor skills may be affected by purely
mental practice” (p. 56). The naïve responses of the participants
in this study are in stark contrast to the evidence that has recently
emerged from sporting samples. Researchers have asked athletes
and dancers to indicate why, where, how, what, and when they
use mental imagery processes (e.g., Nordin and Cumming, 2005;
MacIntyre and Moran, 2007a,b). Athletes’ responses from both
interviews and surveys demonstrated a comprehensive knowl-
edge of the multi-model potential of imagery, their awareness
of both mental practice and mental travel effect, and high-
lighted the sophisticated nature of their understanding of imagery
(MacIntyre and Moran, 2010).
In 2002, Moran suggested that it would be interesting to dis-
cover if top athletes have greater insight into and control over
their use of imagery compared with their less successful counter-
parts. To date the preponderance of the evidence favors an exper-
tise effect for meta-imagery. In fact, a model of meta-imagery
in action suggests that there are three components-knowledge,
monitoring and control, which opens up possibilities of devel-
oping a test of meta-imagery (MacIntyre and Moran, 2010).
Furthermore, contemporary evidence from cognitive psychology
supports the role of meta-cognitive knowledge of imagery abil-
ity and relates it to our ability to judge individual episodes of
imagery (Pearson et al., 2011). The voluntary nature of imagery
and the role of conscious awareness during imagery tasks make
it amenable to introspection (Pearson et al., 2008), ironically
the method that was central to the demise of the scientific
study of imagery, a century ago (see Block, 1983). While in
the past the study of metacognition has targeted intellectual
skills “if intellectual and perceptual-motor skills rely on simi-
lar mechanisms, one would expect metacognition to apply to
the guidance of perceptual-motor skills, just as it does to the
guidance of intellectual skills” (Augustyn and Rosenbaum, 2005,
p. 911). Consequently, armed with a comprehensive roadmap of
imagery processes and an increased understanding of action, the
study of meta-imagery could provide a back door into the typ-
ically impenetrable realm of sensory perception (Pearson et al.,
2011).
SOME OBSERVATIONS ON THE STRENGTH-BASED
APPROACH WITHIN COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE
In this paper, we have argued that a strength-based approach
to mental imagery can augment rather than replace the tradi-
tional approach to this construct. After all, this latter approach has
been highly successful in, for example, illuminating both visual
imagery and visual cognition (Kosslyn et al., 2006). More recently,
this latter approach has led to advances in our understanding of
the overlap between visual perception and imagery in scanning
tasks (Borst and Kosslyn, 2008). Based on such progress, there is
an imperative for researchers to maintain the traditional approach
in order to answer key questions. For example, the use of ran-
domized controlled trials to explore the role of motor imagery
in patients with sub-acute neglect (Welfringer et al., 2011) and
with stroke victims (Ietswaart et al., 2011) are essential for the
validation of imagery interventions. Similarly, the role of men-
tal imagery among clinical patient samples (Pearson et al., 2012)
and stroke victims (Confalonieri et al., 2012) requires contin-
ued investigation. Unsurprisingly, studies of patients will, in all
likelihood, continue to inform our appreciation of the deficits,
challenges, and recovery strategies of those with specific with rare
disorders (ter Horst et al., 2012). This again raises aforementioned
paradox of expertise among patient samples. A recent study with
a Paralympic athlete led to the conclusion that only tasks that we
have physical experience of recruit the motor system (Olson and
Nyberg, 2011).
Despite the success of traditional approaches to imagery, how-
ever, a strength-based approach may contribute in the devel-
opment and refinement of imagery inventories, as implicitly
employed in the case of the Object-Spatial Imagery Questionnaire
(Blajenkova et al., 2006). Similarly, investigations of the neu-
ral processes underlying imagery effects in expert samples will
help to elucidate both applied and theoretical aspects of men-
tal imagery. However, the new approach advocated in this paper
has its limits too. For example, analyzing the imagery skills of
motor experts in an atheoretical manner will not advance concep-
tual understanding and may provide spurious findings. Instead,
a rigorous, theory-driven approach with converging methods
is required for strength-based approaches to yield benefits to
imagery researchers. As anticipated by Kosslyn et al. (2002) over a
decade ago, “individual differences can actually help to reveal the
nature of underlying mechanisms (p. 342).”
CONCLUSIONS
Cognitive neuroscience has made impressive progress in the illu-
mination of the nature, function, and neural basis of mental
imagery (Kosslyn, 2010). Nevertheless, certain aspects of this con-
struct (e.g., its relationship to skilled performance) have been
relatively neglected by mainstream imagery researchers. In this
article, certain significant trends—antecedents of a strength-
based approach to imagery—that may be detected over more
than a century of imagery research have been highlighted. These
trends provide signposts for at least four potentially fruitful
new avenues of inquiry. Firstly, imagery research continues to
evolve from an excessively narrow focus on the visual sense (e.g.,
Galton, 1883; Perky, 1910) to a modern concern with inves-
tigation of the true multi-sensory character of this construct.
Next, theoretical understanding of mental imagery has deep-
ened with increasing awareness of the multi-dimensional nature
of this construct. Thirdly, major methodological advances, both
in technology and sampling, have illuminated both fundamen-
tal and applied questions. Finally, the preliminary application
of the “strength-based” approach has been shown to be useful
in enriching our understanding of the neural basis of expert
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performance (Ross et al., 2003; Milton et al., 2007; Olsson
et al., 2008) and the “clever application” of imagery in sport
(Moran et al., 2012), dance (Bläsing et al., 2012), and music
contexts (Meister et al., 2004). It is noteworthy that the inter-
est in exploring the naturalistic expertise in imagery (e.g., dance)
with neuroscientific methods stems is bi-directional. For exam-
ple, “neuroscientists have turned to dancers as a valuable human
resource in possession of a rich skill set . . . to address issues
of how the brain coordinates perception with action” (Cross,
2010, p. 197). The implications of augmenting existing paradigms
with the “strength-based” approach will be most obvious in the
domain of motor cognition where issues of dynamic imagery,
visual imagery perspective, and multi-modal integration can be
explored. Also, the area of metacognition research is a rapidly
growing field and meta-imagery as a topic is evolving. Meta-
imagery research is a topic than can benefit from the “strength-
based” approach. In summary, through the lens of motor cog-
nition, further exploration of the construct of mental imagery
will ensure that the topic of will remain part of the cognitive
neuroscience lexicon for many decades to come.
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